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A MODEST REFORM: THE NEW RULE 32.1
PERMITTING CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS
Anne Coyle*
INTRODUCTION
In 1964 the Judicial Conference of the United States' ("Judicial
Conference") recommended that federal appellate courts publish
"only those opinions which are of general precedential value."'2 The
conference report cited the rapidly growing number of published
opinions and the increasing practical difficulty of maintaining library
facilities as justification for limiting publication.' It was not until eight
years later-after seeing a dramatic increase in federal appellate
caseloads4-- that the Judicial Conference directed the circuits to
develop individual plans for selective publication of opinions.' By
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Marc M. Arkin for her legal insights and my family for their love and
support.
1. The chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of
International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit comprise the
Judicial Conference, which is authorized by Congress to study the operation and
effect of the general rules of federal practice and procedure, and to make
recommendations for any changes necessary to promote fairness and judicial
efficiency. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2004).
2. U.S. Judicial Conference, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the U.S. 11 (1964) [hereinafter Report of the Judicial Conference
1964].
3. Id.
4. For a discussion of the expansion of the federal appellate caseload since the
1960s, see Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 685, 692-94 (2000); David
Greenwald & Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1133, 1145-47 (2002). For a discussion of the history of the fear of proliferating
case law, see Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influence: Technology and
Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 541, 545-46
(1997).
5. U.S. Judicial Conference, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the U.S. 33 (1972) [hereinafter Report of the Judicial Conference
1972].
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1974, every federal appellate court had adopted rules limiting
publication.6
Selective publication plans are based on the premise that producing
an opinion of publishable quality requires a judge to invest much
more time and effort than does drafting an opinion that merely
explains a decision for the benefit of the litigants.7 Thus, the
publication of opinions that serve no law-making function, but merely
apply clearly established law to the facts at hand, is argued to waste
judicial resources.8  Selective publication plans typically limit
publication to opinions that rule on an issue of first impression,
modify a previously announced rule, reverse a published decision of
an agency or district court, or create a conflict with another circuit.9
Judicial opinions not selected for publication are generally referred
to as "unpublished" opinions; advances in technology, however, have
rendered this term a misnomer.1" "Unpublished" opinions are now
made available in book form through West's Federal Appendix,
online through Westlaw and LEXIS, and, by federal law, as of
December 17, 2004, all opinions rendered by a federal court must be
posted on the court's own website. 11 The term "unpublished" should
therefore be understood to mean designated by the rendering court as
"not for publication" or "non-precedential" and not published in an
official federal reporter.12
6. See, e.g., Donna Stienstra, Unpublished Dispositions: Problems of Access and
Use in the Courts of Appeals 5-14 (1985) (recounting the history of the development
of selective publication plans in the federal courts of appeals). Although district
courts rarely issue published opinions, district court publication and citation practices
are outside the scope of this Note. See K.K. DuVivier, Developments and Practice
Notes, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the Role of
Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 397, 400 n.8 (2001) (noting that on
average a federal district judge selects only four to six opinions per year for
publication). The practice of issuing unpublished district court opinions is not
controversial; indeed, commentators have been concerned exclusively with
publication of appellate opinions. The proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure concerning citation to unpublished opinions applies only to the
federal courts of appeals. See infra notes 34, 35, and accompanying text.
7. Federal Judicial Center, Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions: A
Report of the Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies of the Advisory
Council on Appellate Justice 3 (1973) (stating that "the judicial time and effort
essential for the development of an opinion to be published for posterity and widely
distributed is necessarily greater than that sufficient to enable a judge to provide a
statement so that the parties can understand the reason for the decision").
8. See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished
Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 Mich.
L. Rev. 940, 942 (1989).
9. See, e.g., D.C. Cir. R. 36(a)(2).
10. See, e.g., Shuldberg, supra note 4 passim.
11. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913
(2003).
12. See Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on
App. Rules, to Judge Anthony A. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Pract.
CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS
The vast majority of cases terminated on the merits 13 in the federal
courts of appeals result in unpublished opinions. 4 From October 1,
2001, to September 30, 2002, approximately eighty-one per cent of
cases resolved on the merits in the federal courts of appeals were
disposed of by unpublished opinions. 5 . Although some scholars
criticize the practice of selective publication of appellate opinions, 6
the accompanying "no-citation rules" are the most controversial
aspect of the practice.1 7  Perhaps the most fundamental technique
practiced by a party attempting to persuade a court to rule in her
favor involves citing, in a brief or at oral argument, prior cases that
articulate legal rules or reasoning that bear favorably on the party's
case. 8 Cases with binding precedential authority have the highest
value to litigants, but parties frequently cite cases (and other legal and
non-legal sources) for their persuasive value. In federal circuit courts,
all published opinions stand as binding precedent within the circuit
unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. 9 No-citation rules
forbid or disfavor the citation of unpublished appellate opinions to the
rendering circuit courts (and in some cases to all courts20) except in
related cases for purposes of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law
of the case."' No-citation rules deprive unpublished opinions of
binding precedential value in unrelated cases, and the strictest no-
citation rules prevent the use of unpublished opinions even for their
persuasive value.22
& Proc. 28-29 (May 22, 2003) at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/app0803.pdf
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Report].
13. A judgment on the merits is "delivered after the court has heard and
evaluated the evidence and the parties' substantive merits." Black's Law Dictionary
1119 (7th ed. 1999).
14. Administrative Office of United States Courts, 2002 Annual Report of the
Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts 39 (2003), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/tables/s03sep02.pdf [hereinafter 2002 Annual
Report].
15. See id.
16. See generally Robel, supra note 8; Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts
of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain
and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 757 (1995);
Johanna S. Schiavoni, Who's Afraid of Precedent?: The Debate over the Precedential
Value of Unpublished Opinions, 49 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1859 (2002).
17. See infra Part II.
18. For a discussion of the deeply rooted common law practice of citing prior
decisions, see Lance A. Wade, Note, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due
Process Argument Against Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial
Decisions, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 695,700-07 (2001).
19. For a discussion of how circuit panels create binding precedent, see Cooper &
Berman, supra note 4, at 719-23.
20. See 2d Cir. R. 0.23 (prohibiting the citation of unpublished Second Circuit
opinions in any court); see also infra note 173 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., 7th Cir. R. 53(b)(2)(iv).
22. See id.; 2d Cir. R. 0.23; 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a); Fed. Cir. R. 47.6(b).
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Currently only the Third and Eleventh Circuits allow citation of
unpublished opinions without restriction.23 The D.C. Circuit allows
unrestricted citation of unpublished opinions issued after January 1,
2002,24 but prohibits citation of unpublished opinions issued prior to
that date.25 Four circuits forbid citation in unrelated cases.26 Five
circuits disfavor citation, but allow reference when an unpublished
opinion has "precedential" or "persuasive" value on a material issue
and no published opinion would serve as well.
The controversy surrounding citation of unpublished opinions
intensified following Anastasoff v. United States.28 In that case, an
Eighth Circuit panel held, in an opinion written by Judge Richard S.
Arnold, that the circuit's rule denying precedential effect to
unpublished opinions exceeded the bounds of the power granted to
the judiciary under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 9 On
rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit vacated the panel's decision,
leaving the constitutional issue unresolved.3" The following year, the
Ninth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in Hart v. Massanari.31
There, Judge Alex Kozinski concluded that rules that allow courts to
issue nonprecedential opinions are both constitutionally sound and
essential to the functioning of the modern judiciary.32
These cases ignited a vigorous debate among scholars about the
proper treatment of unpublished opinions.33  The Judicial
Conference's Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules ("Advisory
Committee") attempted to resolve the controversy by approving an
amendment ("New Rule 32.1") to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure ("FRAP") that would allow unrestricted citation to
unpublished opinions.' New Rule 32.1 only addresses the issue of
23. See 3d Cir. R. 28.3; 11th Cir. R. 36-2. However, the Third Circuit itself will not
cite an unpublished opinion. See 3d Cir. lOP 5.7.
24. D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(1)(B).
25. D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(1)(A).
26. See 2d Cir. R. 0.23; 7th Cir. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a); Fed. Cir. R.
47.6(b); see also infra note 160 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit forbids
citation of unpublished opinions issued prior to January 1, 1996. 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3.
27. See 1st Cir. R. 32.3(a)(2); 4th Cir. R. 36(c); 6th Cir. R. 28(g); 8th Cir. R. 28(i);
10th Cir. R. 36.3(B); see also infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. The Fifth
Circuit allows citation of unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 1996 for their
persuasive value. 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
28. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000);
see also infra Part 1I.
29. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
30. Anastasoff, 235 F.3d at 1054.
31. 266 F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
32. Id. at 1160.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 12, at 28-29. New Rule 32.1 was
published and distributed to members of the bench, bar, and general public for
comment; the commentary period ended February 18, 2004. Following their Spring
2004 meeting, the Advisory Committee will make a final recommendation to the
Standing Committee, which in turn will submit its recommendation to the Judicial
2474 [Vol. 72
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citation: It takes no position on whether, or under what
circumstances, courts should issue unpublished opinions; nor does the
New Rule 32.1 suggest what. weight courts should accord to
unpublished opinions
35
This Note argues that although New Rule 32.1 does not completely
resolve the no-citation controversy, it is the most practical response in
light of all the arguments. Part I summarizes the debate surrounding
the treatment of unpublished opinions as it emerged in Anastasoff and
Hart. Part II considers the arguments advanced for and against no-
citation rules and introduces the three versions of the proposed
amendment to the FRAP considered by the Advisory Committee.
Part III analyzes the three versions of the rule in light of the
arguments discussed in Part II. This Note concludes that the New
Rule 32.1 approved by the Advisory Committee should be enacted
because it will promote judicial accountability and litigants'
autonomy, but that the Judicial Conference should monitor the
issuance of summary orders36 after the enactment of New Rule 32.1.
I. THE CASES
A. Anastasoff v. United States
In Anastasoff, appellant Anastasoff sought review of a district court
decision upholding the denial, by the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), of her federal tax refund.37 The IRS denied her claim under
a statutory provision limiting refunds to taxes paid in the three years
prior to the filing of a claim.38 Although she mailed her claim within
this period, the IRS received and filed the claim three years and one
day after she overpaid her taxes.3 9 Anastasoff argued that she was
entitled to her refund under the "mailbox rule," which provides that a
claim is received when postmarked.4" In an unpublished opinion, a
prior Eighth Circuit panel had rejected the same argument as applied
Conference for transmission to the Supreme Court. Congress will then have seven
months to reject, modify, or defer the rule, and if it takes no action the rule will take
effect as a matter of law. Administrative Office of United States Courts, The Rule
Making Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last modified Sept. 30, 2003).
35. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 12, at 28.
36. As used in this Note, the term "summary order" denotes a disposition of a
case that fails to provide any explanation of the court's application of the facts to the
law. See also infra Parts II.C.1.-2.
37. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot en
banc by 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The Mailbox Rule, 26 U.S.C. § 7502 (2004), applies only to untimely
claims. Anastasoff's claim was considered timely, however, under 26 U.S.C. §
6511(a), the statutory provision that measures the timeliness of refund claims.
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
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to a claim mailed prior to the three-year bar and received shortly
thereafter.41 Anastasoff contended that the court was not bound by
the prior opinion, because Eighth Circuit Rule 28(A)(i) states that
unpublished opinions are not precedent. 42
The court held that the Eighth Circuit's rule exceeded the "judicial
power" granted by Article III of the federal Constitution.43 As Judge
Richard Arnold reasoned, the doctrine of precedent, which posits that
the "declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for the
decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated
parties," is inherent in the definition of "judicial power."'  By
allowing courts to ignore the precedential effect of prior decisions, the
Eighth Circuit rule improperly expanded judicial power.45
Judge Arnold based his conclusion that Article III incorporates the
doctrine of precedent on an originalist interpretation.46 He contended
that by the time of the framing of the Constitution, adherence to
precedent had been established by the writings of Sir Edward Coke
and Sir William Blackstone as an "immemorial custom. ' 47 Noting that
"Coke used precedent... [as] his main weapon in the fight for the
independence of the judiciary and limits on the king's prerogative
rights, '48 Judge Arnold further contended that the Framers likewise
intended precedent to function as a bulwark against tyranny and as a
necessary condition for separation of judicial and legislative powers.49
Judge Arnold concluded that although Article III does not mandate
rigid stare decisis, judges must justify any departure from precedent;
courts may overrule bad precedents, but must explain their reasons
for doing so.5" Judge Arnold accepted the practice of selective
publication insofar as opinions would not be published in a federal
reporter, because there was no official reporting system in place at the
time of the framing of the Constitution." Nevertheless, Judge Arnold
41. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899; see Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375 MN,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam).
42. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
43. Id. at 900. Section 1 of Article III states that "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
44. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900 (citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)).
45. Id.
46. Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation that seeks to discover
the actual intent of the Framers through their writings and the historical background
against which they wrote. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The
Political Seduction of the Law 133-60 (1990); see also John Hart Ely, Democracy and
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 1-11 (1980) (explaining judicial
"interpretivism," which seeks the original understanding of the Framer's intentions).
47. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
48. Id. at 900 n.6.
49. Id. at 900.
50. Id. at 905.
51. Id. at 903.
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contended, the Framers would not have supported the denial of
precedential status to unpublished opinions.52
The Eighth Circuit later vacated the Anastasoff decision as moot
because the IRS had agreed to refund Anastasoff's claim by the time
the court reheard the case en banc.53 Nonetheless, Judge Arnold's
opinion provoked an impassioned rebuttal from the Ninth Circuit's
Judge Alex Kozinski in Hart v. Massanari.54
B. Hart v. Massanari
In Hart, appellant's counsel cited an unpublished opinion in
violation of the Ninth Circuit's no-citation rule, which forbids citation
of unpublished opinions for all but related-case uses.55 The circuit
court ordered counsel to show cause why he should not be
disciplined.56 The court rejected counsel's argument, which relied on
Anastasoff, that the Ninth Circuit rule may be unconstitutional.57
Judge Kozinski engaged in an originalist interpretation of his own
to show that Judge Arnold's originalist analysis misconstrued the
Framers' intent.58 According to Judge Kozinski, the modern concept
of precedent differs from that known to the Framers, and thus cannot
inhere in the definition of "judicial Power."59  Judge Kozinski's
historical analysis posited that common law judges did not make, but
rather "found" the law, which existed independently of judges.6"
Judges considered prior decisions as evidence of what the law was, but
remained free to conclude that an existing decision was an incorrect
interpretation of the ltw.61 Furthermore, the most important sources
of law were not judicial opinions, but treatises such as the
commentaries of Coke and Blackstone.2
Judge Kozinski contended that precedent in the modern sense of
stare decisis did not emerge until the establishment of both a reliable
reporting system and a settled judicial hierarchy in the mid-nineteenth
52. Id.
53. Anastasoffv. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
54. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
55. Id. at 1158-59. Related-case use includes citing a case for purposes of
collateral estoppel, res judicata, law of the case, or factual purposes such as to show
double jeopardy, sanctionable conduct, notice, entitlement to attorneys fees, or the
existence of a related case. See 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
56. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1162-69; see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
59. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1162-63.
60. Id. at 1163-64 (citing Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the
Common Law 343-44 (5th ed. 1956)). Judge Kozinski wrote: "The idea that judges
declared rather than made the law remained firmly entrenched in English
jurisprudence until the early nineteenth century." Id. at 1165 (citing David M.
Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law 977 (1980)).
61. Id. at 1164.
62. Id. at 1165.
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century.6 3 Prior to that time, he argued, the common law was based
on custom, which allowed flexibility for the law to evolve with the
changing circumstances of society.64 Judge Kozinski suggested that
the Framers would not have intended to strip the law of its flexibility
through a regime of rigid stare decisis.65
Judge Kozinski further contended that rules that allow courts to
issue nonprecedential opinions do not free courts from the doctrine of
precedent, but rather are a means of dealing with precedent in the
context of a modern legal system.66  He distinguished the
constitutional limitations imposed by the "Cases or Controversies"
provision of Article III, which specifies the scope of the federal
judiciary's jurisdiction,67 from its grant of "judicial Power," which he
claimed has never been interpreted to limit the administrative power
of the federal courts.' Judge Kozinski noted that many practices
common in the federal courts have no clear constitutional
foundation. 69 Because none of these practices have been held subject
to any limitation inherent within "judicial Power," Judge Kozinski
concluded that the practice of issuing nonprecedential opinions should
not be singled out for such treatment.7 °
II. THE COMMENTARY
Although Anastasoff attracted some supporters of Judge Arnold's
analysis,71 the weight of commentary rejected Article III as a basis for
63. Id. at 1164 n.10 (citing R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence 30-31 (2d ed. 1964)).
64. Id. at 1167.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1160.
67. The "Cases or Controversies" provision enumerates which cases may properly
be adjudicated in the federal courts. U.S. Const. art. III.
68. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159.
69. Id. at 1160.
Among [these practices] are the practices of issuing written opinions that
speak for the court rather than for individual judges, adherence to the
adversarial (rather than inquisitorial) model of developing cases, limits on
the exercise of equitable relief, hearing appeals with panels of three or more
judges and countless others that are so much a part of the way we do
business that few would think to question them.
Id. at 1160-61.
70. Id.
71. See Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Note, Precedent, Judicial Power, and the
Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 Stan. L.
Rev. 1037, 1044-50 (2002) (arguing that Article III incorporates a doctrine of binding
precedent insofar as the interpretation of written law is concerned); Drew R.
Quitschau, Note, Anastasoff v. United States: Uncertainty in the Eighth Circuit-Is
There a Constitutional Right to Cite Unpublished Opinions?, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 847, 867-
69 (2002) (arguing that the Eighth Circuit's no-citation rule is an unconstitutional
expansion of Article III power); Suzanne 0. Snowden, Note, "That's My Holding and
I'm Not Sticking To It!" Court Rules that Deprive Unpublished Opinions of
Precedential Authority Distort the Common Law, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1253, 1269-70
[Vol. 722478
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declaring nonprecedential opinions unconstitutional. 2  Indeed, the
Advisory Committee did not even consider any version of the New
Rule 32.1 that would prohibit courts from issuing nonprecedential
opinions.73 Nonetheless, at least one critic took issue with Judge
Kozinski's view that the doctrine of precedent permitted courts to
ignore prior cases.74
Although Anastasoff and Hart addressed the constitutionality of
denying unpublished opinions precedential effect, rather than the
constitutionality of forbidding citation of unpublished opinions, 75 the
ensuing debate among commentators has focused primarily on
citation. Accordingly, Parts II.A. and II.B. provide a summary of the
arguments advanced for and against no-citation rules. Part II.C.
examines the possible effects of permitting citation to unpublished
opinions and introduces the three versions of the New Rule 32.1
considered by the Advisory Committee.
A. Arguments for No-Citation Rules
Supporters of no-citation rules contend that these rules are
necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the federal circuits
because judges would otherwise spend too much time drafting
unpublished opinions.76 They further contend that to preserve a level
playing field between institutional litigants and those with fewer
(2001) (arguing that nonprecedential opinions violate the doctrines of precedent and
stare decisis).
72. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (adopting Judge Kozinski's reasoning in Hart); see also R. Ben Brown, Judging
in the Days of the Early Republic: A Critique of Judge Richard Arnold's Use of
History in Anastasoff v. United States, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 355, 356-60 (2001)
(critiquing Judge Arnold's historical analysis); Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Citability and the
Nature of Precedent in the Courts of Appeals: A Response to Dean Robel, 35 Ind. L.
Rev. 423, 427 (2002) (contending that Judge Arnold erroneously constitutionalized
horizontal stare decisis); Jon A. Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions,
Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions
Precedential Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 195, 211-15 (2001)
(concluding that due process, not Article III, provides a constitutional basis for
requiring that unpublished opinions be accorded precedential value).
73. See generally Advisory Committee Report, supra note 12.
74. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 72, at 428 (arguing that ignoring prior cases
creates at least the appearance of arbitrary decision making).
75. See supra Part I. Judge Arnold found the denial of precedential effect to
unpublished opinions unconstitutional, irrespective of the fact that citation was
permitted (though disfavored) under the Eighth Circuit rule. Anastasoff v. United
States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000). After concluding that Article III posed no barrier to issuing nonprecedential
opinions, Judge Kozinski addressed only the policy reasons for, but not the
constitutionality of, forbidding citation to unpublished opinions. Hart v. Massanari,
266 F.3d 1155, 1176-80 (9th Cir. 2001).
76. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
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resources, all parties should be prohibited from bringing unpublished
opinions to the attention of the courts.
7
1. No-Citation Rules Are Necessary to Promote Judicial Efficiency
The argument most frequently advanced in favor of no-citation
rules is that they promote judicial efficiency.78 This argument has two
parts: 1) unpublished opinions are necessary to the efficient operation
of federal appellate courts, and 2) no-citation rules are necessary to
preserve the efficiencies gained by selective publication.
a. Why Unpublished Opinions Are Necessary
In Hart, Judge Kozinski argued that circuit courts depend on
selective publication to develop "a coherent and internally consistent
body of caselaw to serve as binding authority for themselves and the
courts below them."79 In drafting a precedential opinion, a judge must
do a number of things that make the process much more time
consuming than writing a nonprecedential opinion."0 The judge must
sift through and state all the relevant facts while excluding those that
are irrelevant; consider all relevant legal rules and policy implications;
provide an explanation as to why the court is selecting one of several
potentially applicable rules; and phrase the rule with precision and
regard for its future application to other constellations of facts.81
Judge Kozinski wrote: "Writing a precedential opinion, thus, involves
much more than deciding who wins and who loses in a particular case.
It is a solemn judicial act that sets the course of the law for hundreds
or thousands of litigants and potential litigants.81 2
No one disputes that federal appellate courts lack the resources to
draft precedential opinions in each and every case that comes before
them.83 Writing limited opinions that serve only to inform litigants of
the rationale behind the court's decision conserves judicial resources
and makes it possible for courts to publish opinions of the requisite
quality in appropriate cases.8' Judge Kozinski insisted that this
practice does not lead to arbitrary decision-making because "formal
publication guidelines and judges' enforcement of them through their
77. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177; see also Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt,
Please Don't Cite This! Why We Don't Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions,
Cal. Law., June 2000, at 43-44.
79. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1176.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1176.
82. Id. at 1177.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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interactions with each other, keep judges honest in deciding whether
or not to publish. 8
5
b. Allowing Citation to Unpublished Opinions Undermines the
Purpose of Selective Publication
Judge Kozinski further argued that allowing parties to cite
unpublished dispositions defeats the purpose of selective publication. 6
If opinions written merely to explain to litigants how their cases have
been decided may be cited as precedent, conscientious judges will
necessarily spend more time crafting them.87 Furthermore, if judges
agree on the result but not the reasoning of a decision, they will
generally join an opinion that cannot be cited as precedent.88 In the
absence of a no-citation rule, however, they are more likely to concur
or dissent.89 Essentially, Judge Kozinski argued that judges would
treat unpublished dispositions as mini-opinions, thereby preventing
them from devoting the necessary time to producing opinions of
publishable quality and keeping the law of the circuit consistent.9°
2. No-Citation Rules Promote Unfairness to Litigants
Another defense of no-citation rules is based on the claim that
because unpublished opinions are not equally accessible to all
litigants, repeat litigants, such as the federal government or insurance
companies, may gain an unfair advantage by collecting and using these
opinions.91 Forbidding citation is supposed to level the playing field.92
Assuming a decrease in judicial efficiency, one commentator argues
that abolishing no-citation rules would unfairly disadvantage litigants
with fewer resources because they have less ability to withstand delays
in the adjudication of their cases.93 In civil cases, injured parties-for
instance, tort plaintiffs without resources to pay their medical bills-
would be pressured to settle on less favorable terms rather than
endure protracted litigation.94 Habeas corpus cases would be delayed,
85. Id. at 1177 n.35 (quoting Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the
Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process
325, 331 (2001)).
86. Id. at 1178.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. A disposition is the court's final determination of the case. Black's Law
Dictionary 484 (7th ed. 1999). An opinion is the court's written explanation of its
decision, usually including a statement of facts, points of law, and rationale. Id. at 895.
91. See, e.g., Stienstra, supra note 6, at 20 n.40.
92. Id. at 21.
93. See Daniel B. Levin, Case Note, Fairness and Precedent, 110 Yale L.J. 1295,
1301 (2001) (discussing Anastasoff).
94. Id. at 1300-01.
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unfairly disadvantaging criminal defendants.95  Furthermore, the
increased time, energy, and money necessary to make use of
unpublished opinions, even when the opinions are available
electronically, would particularly disadvantage poor, pro se, and
public-interest litigants and public defenders.96
The arguments in favor of no-citation rules are premised on the
belief that judicial efficiency would necessarily decline in the face of
free citation to unpublished opinions. Critics of the rules dispute this
premise. The next part provides a summary of critics' arguments
against no-citation rules.
B. Arguments Against No-Citation Rules
Critics of no-citation rules find the efficiency and unfairness
arguments unpersuasive. Selective publication adequately addresses
the requirements of judicial efficiency, they argue, without prohibiting
citation of unpublished opinions.97 Furthermore, the widespread
availability of unpublished opinions and the time saved by electronic
research minimizes unfairness to litigants.98
1. No-Citation Rules Are Not Essential to a Selective Publication
Regime
The American College of Trial Lawyers attacked Judge Kozinski's
efficiency argument because he failed to offer any evidence or
authority to demonstrate that those circuits that allow citation to
unpublished opinions have suffered the adverse consequences he
predicted.99 Judge Kozinski cited no empirical evidence that the
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits,1" all of which release their
unpublished opinions for online publication and permit counsel to cite
them, spend more time preparing their unpublished opinions than do
the anti-citation circuits that release unpublished opinions for internet
95. Id. at 1301.
96. Id.; see also William R. Mills, The Shape of the Universe: The Impact of
Unpublished Opinions on the Process of Legal Research, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 59, 71-75 (2003) (asserting that circuit court websites contain only a small
fraction of their unpublished opinions and that neither Westlaw nor LEXIS has
compiled an exhaustive database of unpublished opinions from any federal circuit);
infra note 110.
97. See, e.g., Cooper & Berman, supra note 4.
98. See, e.g., Shuldberg, supra note 4, at 559-60.
99. William T. Hangley, Opinions Hidden, Citations Forbidden: A Report and
Recommendations of the American College of Trial Lawyers on the Publication and
Citation of Nonbinding Federal Circuit Court Opinions, 208 F.R.D. 645, 689-90 (2002);
see also supra Part II.A.1.
100. Since Hart was decided, both the First and D.C. Circuits have modified their
rules to allow citation. See 1st Cir. R. 32.3(a)(2); D.C. Cir. R. 28(c).
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publication."' Nor did Judge Kozinski demonstrate that the quality of
reporter published opinions in the former group of circuits is lower, or
th"at significantly less time is invested in those opinions, than in the
anti-citation circuits. 1°2
Judge Kozinski's argument also assumed that if the Ninth Circuit's
no-citation rule was abolished, the court would be inundated with
briefs citing unpublished opinions. 10 He presented no evidence,
however, that other circuits have been overwhelmed with such
citations."°4 Moreover, the American College of Trial Lawyers
concluded, it is illogical to think that counsel will rely on unpublished
opinions-possibly irritating the court and squandering limited
space-unless no published opinion bears on the issue. 15
The Advisory Committee noted that permitting citation should not
undermine the efficiency gained by use of unpublished opinions
because these opinions are already cited in other fora, read, discussed,
and have even been reversed by the Supreme Court.0 6 If such
scrutiny has not already eroded efficiency gains, permitting citation of
unpublished opinions is not likely to do so either, provided the courts
are not required to treat unpublished opinions as binding. 7
2. No-Citation Rules Are Not Necessary to Promote Fairness
In addition to rejecting the efficiency argument, critics argue that
the availability of unpublished opinions through West's Federal
Appendix, Westlaw and LEXIS online,0 8 and, imminently, all of the
circuit courts own websites,' °9 greatly alleviates concerns over unequal
access." O Furthermore, electronic research makes it much easier to
101. The anti-citation circuits are the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits.
Hangley, supra note 99, at 689-90.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 690.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 12, at 33 (citing Holmes Group,
Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (reversing an
unpublished decision of the Federal Circuit); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506 (2002) (reversing an unpublished decision of the Second Circuit).
107. Advisory Committee Reports, supra note 12, at 33. An opinion designated as
"unpublished," even if actually published in West's Federal Appendix or on the
internet, would be treated as non-binding, while a "published" opinion would be
binding. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
108. Except for those rendered by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which must still
be obtained from the courts themselves. See Hangley, supra note 99, at 654-55.
109. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
110. See generally Shuldberg, supra note 4. But see Mills, supra note 96, at 70-75.
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits post unpublished
opinions on their websites. See http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2004); http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2004);
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/
(last visited Mar. 24, 2004); http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2004);
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locate relevant precedent despite the great and ever-increasing
number of opinions."'
Moreover, repeat litigants already use unpublished opinions to their
advantage even without citing them in litigation.' 12 One survey of the
heads of six federal government offices responsible for appellate
litigation showed that unpublished opinions are circulated to
attorneys within the offices and filed for future office reference." 3
The survey also revealed that the offices used unpublished opinions in
making litigation and settlement decisions and writing briefs, as well
as in determining whether to appeal."4
In addition to taking issue with the arguments in support of no-
citation rules, critics contend that no-citation rules wreak a variety of
harms on the legal system. Critics of no-citation rules fall into two
camps. One camp argues that prohibiting citation of unpublished
opinions harms litigants, attorneys, and the integrity of the legal
system; a rule allowing unrestricted citation, while recognizing the
court's power to accord the opinion whatever weight it deems
appropriate, would satisfy these critics."5 The other camp takes the
more extreme position that denying precedential effect to appellate
opinions (at least within the rendering circuit) poses a risk of arbitrary
judicial action; these critics demand a rule that in addition to
permitting citation, requires courts to consider unpublished opinions
binding." 6
3. No-Citation Rules Violate Due Process by Subjecting Individuals
to Arbitrary Judicial Action
Critics who argue that denying unpublished opinions binding
precedential effect results in arbitrary judicial action invoke the
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process.1 7 Due process,
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2004);
http://www.cal0.uscourts.gov/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 24, 2004). The Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal Circuits do not currently post
unpublished opinions. See http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2004);
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004); http://www.call.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2004);
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); http://www.fedcir.gov/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2004).
111. See generally Shuldberg, supra note 4.
112. Robel, supra note 8, at 955-59.
113. See id. at 957-59.
114. See id.
115. See generally Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4.
116. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 16, at 797-800; see also Strongman, supra note 72,
at 211.
117. See Strongman, supra note 72, at 211. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment states "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Wade, supra note 18, at
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which essentially requires fairness of process, protects litigants from
arbitrary judicial action. Critics claim that selective publication and
no-citation rules allow courts to ignore or contradict previous
decisions without justification.' 18 One commentator offered the Fifth
Circuit case Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit119 as an example of
such arbitrary judicial action. 2 ' There, the Fifth Circuit held that
Dallas Area Rapid Transit ("DART") lacked immunity as a
governmental unit of the state of Texas, 2' a holding that directly
conflicted with the same court's previous unpublished disposition of
Anderson v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit.'
In Anderson, a former employee sued DART, alleging employment
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act.123 The district court found
that DART, as a political subdivision of the state of Texas, was
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.'24 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in an unpublished
decision,2 5 which lacked precedential value under Fifth Circuit Rule
47.5.4.126 One year later, Williams presented the same issue to the
district court. Relying on Anderson, the district court held that
DART was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.1 27
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that DART possessed no such
immunity, 28 and rejecting Anderson as unpersuasive for failing to
properly examine Eleventh Amendment immunity.29 Judge Smith,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, questioned the
722 (arguing that the abrogation of a deeply rooted common law practice violates due
process).
118. See Strongman, supra note 72, at 212.
119. 242 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2001).
120. See Strongman, supra note 72, at 212-13.
121. Williams, 242 F.3d at 322.
122. 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (table), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1062
(1999); see also Strongman, supra note 72, at 212-13.
123. Anderson v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15493, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1998), affld, 180 F.3d at 265 (per
curiam).
124. Id. at *24; see also Strongman, supra note 72, at 213.
125. Anderson, 180 F. 3d at 265; see also Strongman supra note 72, at 212-13.
126. 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. The Rule provides:
Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not precedent,
except under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the
case (or similarly to show double jeopardy, abuse of the writ, notice,
sanctionable conduct, entitlement to attorney's fees, or the like). An
unpublished opinion may, however, be persuasive. An unpublished opinion
may be cited, but if cited in any document being submitted to the court, a
copy of the unpublished opinion must be attached to each document.
Id.
127. Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2001).
128. Id. at 322.
129. Id. at 318 n.1.
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fundamental fairness of the contradictory treatment of DART in the
two cases. 130
4. No-Citation Rules Undermine Judicial Legitimacy
An idea closely related to due process concerns is the claim that no-
citation rules undermine judicial legitimacy."' Proponents of this
argument tend to disfavor not only no-citation rules, but also selective
publication. 132  One commentator identified five virtues of the
precedential system: stability, certainty, predictability, consistency,
and fidelity to authority.133 The commentator argued that selective
publication and no-citation rules undermine these virtues by
promoting decisions within a circuit and developing a secret body of
law. 134
At the core of the judicial legitimacy argument is the belief that
cases that make law, and therefore deserve publication, are swept
under the rug.'35 Commentators have cited Christie v. United States13 6
and Anderson'37 as two such examples of cases of first impression that
nevertheless were designated not for publication.'38 In another
instance, noted by the American College of Trial Lawyers, the
Federal Circuit held that the Patent Act of 1952 had not eliminated
the defense of prosecution laches but refused to discuss two Federal
130. Id. at 263 (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith wrote:
What is the hapless litigant or attorney, or for that matter a federal district
judge or magistrate judge, to do? The reader should put himself or herself
into the shoes of the attorney for DART. That client is told in May 1999, by
a panel of this court in Anderson, that it is immune, on the basis of a
"comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion." Competent counsel
reasonably would have concluded, and advised his or her client, that it could
count on Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Then, in March 2000, in the instant case, a federal district judge,
understandably citing and relying on the circuit's decision in Anderson, holds
that "[i]t is firmly established that DART is a governmental unit or
instrumentality of the state of Texas." In February 2001, however, a panel,
containing one of the judges who was on the Anderson panel, reverses and
tells DART that, on the basis of well-established Fifth Circuit law from 1986,
it has no such immunity. One can only wonder what competent counsel will
advise the client now.
Id. at 261 (modification in original); see also infra Part III.
131. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 16, at 775-81.
132. See id.; see also Robel, supra note 8, at 959-62; Schiavoni, supra note 16, at
1877-88.
133. Dragich, supra note 16, at 777-81.
134. Id. at 785-91.
135. See Hangley, supra note 99, at 680-84.
136. No. 91-2375 MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446, at *1 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992)
(per curiam). Christie was the unpublished opinion cited by the appellant in
Anastasoff. See supra Part I.A.
137. 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (table), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1062
(1999).
138. See, e.g., Hangley, supra note 99, at 674-75.
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Circuit unpublished opinions that held the opposite and had been
relied on by practitioners for fifteen years.139
lthough defenders ofl no-citation rules maintain that unpublished
opinions involve rote application of law to facts, commentators point
out that cases are withheld from publication when judges agree on the
reasoning but not on the result. 40 Judge Kozinski admitted as much
in Hart v. Massanari.141 If three judges cannot agree on the reasoning
in a case, the commentators argue, the case probably requires more
than a routine analysis and should at the very least be subject to
discussion, if not accorded binding status.'42
Another critique of no-citation rules, based on First Amendment
concerns, focuses not on due process or judicial legitimacy but rather
on the restraint of litigants' ability to press their cases. 143 Proponents
of this argument accept the practice of selective publication but reject
the attendant no-citation rules. 14
5. No-Citation Rules Violate the First Amendment's Free Speech and
Free Petition Clauses
Some commentators contend that rules prohibiting the citation of
unpublished opinions constitute an impermissible content-based
restriction of speech that violates the First Amendment's Free Speech
Clause.1 4 These commentators claim that no-citation rules target the
content of expression and, therefore, cannot survive First Amendment
scrutiny because they fail to advance a compelling governmental
139. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
discussed in Hangley, supra note 99, at 681-82.
140. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1148-49; Hangley, supra note 99, at
681.
141. 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001). Judge Kozinski wrote:
[A]lthough three judges might agree on the outcome of the case before
them, they might not agree on the precise reasoning or the rule to be applied
to future cases. Unpublished concurrences and dissents would become much
more common, as individual judges would feel obligated to clarify their
differences with the majority, even when those differences had no bearing
on the case before them. In short, judges would have to start treating
unpublished dispositions-those they write, those written by other judges on
their panels, and those written by judges on other panels-as mini-opinions.
Id.; see also supra Part II.A.l.b.
142. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1148-49; see also Hangley, supra
note 99, at 683; Cooper & Berman, supra note 4, at 741-43 (discussing the value in
according unpublished circuit court opinions less precedential weight but arguing for
free citation to unpublished opinions).
143. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1161-66; see also Salem M. Katsh
& Alex V. Chachkes, Developments and Practice Notes, Constitutionality of "No-
Citation" Rules, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 287, 289, 306 (2001).
144. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1136; see also Katsh & Chachkes,
supra note 143, at 288-89.
145. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1161-65.
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interest by the most narrowly tailored means available. 146 Assuming
the necessity of selective publication, there are less restrictive means
available to effect its purpose: Judges may refuse to accord
precedential weight to unpublished opinions. 147 No-citation rules are
not essential to the fair administration of justice. 48 At best, no-
citation rules save the court time that it would spend reviewing
unpublished opinions.149  While rules that penalize frivolous legal
arguments are justified as a necessary means of preventing abuse of
the judicial process, rules that "forbid the truthful communication of
relevant information to a governmental body solely because certain
members of that body might find it bothersome to consider" are not.5 °
These commentators further argue that the no-citation rules violate
the Free Petition Clause. 51 The Free Petition Clause guarantees the
right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievance[s],"' 52
and, as the Supreme Court has held, includes the "right of access to
the courts." '53 No-citation rules impair a litigant's ability to present
her "grievances" to a federal appellate court effectively. 5 4  For
example, where a district court may have decided a case differently
than it would have if confronted with an unpublished appellate
opinion on point, the Free Petition Clause requires that the reviewing
court permit a litigant to argue that the reasoning of the unpublished
opinion is persuasive.155
Even assuming no-citation rules do not violate the First
Amendment, 15 6 commentators argue that they cause a hardship to
practitioners, who must navigate a Byzantine system of rules and risk
sanction if they mistakenly cite an unpublished opinion in the wrong
circumstances.
57
146. See id. at 1164. The Supreme Court applies a "strict scrutiny" test to content-
based restrictions of speech: The restriction must advance a compelling governmental
interest using the least restrictive means available. Id.
147. Id. at 1165.
148. Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 143, at 320.
149. Id. at 321.
150. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1164-65.
151. See id. at 1165-66; see also Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 143, at 297.
152. U.S. Const. amend. I.; see also Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1165.
153. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); see
also Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 143, at 297.
154. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1166.
155. Id.
156. The Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a no-citation
rule without comment in 1976 but has not since confronted the issue. Do-Right Auto
Sales v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976).
Petitioner "sought a writ of mandamus against the Seventh Circuit for having struck a
citation to an unpublished opinion from the petitioner's appellate brief." Greenwald
& Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1162 n.113.
157. See, e.g., Hangley, supra note 99, at 653.
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6. The Need for Uniformity in the Courts of Appeals
Ihle Amer.-an. ( Cln.g of Trial Lawyers described the current
patchwork of no-citation rules as "confusing, perilous, and getting
worse." '158 The Advisory Committee noted that the rules place a
special hardship on attorneys who practice in more than one circuit.'59
There are three categories of citation rules currently in force in the
circuits. The first category, adopted by the Second, Seventh, Ninth,
and Federal Circuits, forbids citation of unpublished opinions, except
in related cases for purposes of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and
law of the case.'" Opinions issued by the D.C. Circuit prior to
January 1, 2002, also fall within this category.1
6 1
The second category of rules disfavors but allows citation where
counsel believes (1) an unpublished disposition has "precedential" or
"persuasive" value with regard to a material issue in the case at hand,
and (2) there is no published opinion that would serve as well.162 The
First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits all fall within this
group; 163 the Fourth and Sixth Circuits allow citation for the opinion's
full "precedential value," while the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits limit citation to the opinion's "persuasive" value." It is far
from clear what the Fourth and Sixth Circuits mean by "precedential"
value; indeed, an opinion is designated not for publication precisely
because a panel has determined the opinion does not establish, alter,
modify, clarify, or explain a rule of law.165 "Persuasive" means that
158. Id. at 647.
159. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 12, at 31.
160. 2d Cir. R. 0.23; 7th Cir. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a); Fed. Cir. R.
47.6(b).
161. D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(1)(A).
162. See 1st Cir. R. 32.3(a)(2); 4th Cir. R. 36(c); 6th Cir. R. 28(g); 8th Cir. R. 28(i);
10th Cir. R. 36.3.
163. 1st Cir. R. 32.3(a)(2); 4th Cir. R. 36(c); 6th Cir. R. 28(g); 8th Cir. R. 28(i); 10th
Cir. R. 36.3.
164. 1st Cir. R. 32.3(a)(2); 4th Cir. R. 36(c); 6th Cir. R. 28(g); 8th Cir. R. 28(i); 10th
Cir. R. 36.3. The Fifth Circuit rules differ depending on the date of the decision: One
rule forbids citation to unpublished opinions issued prior to January 1, 1996, which
nevertheless are considered precedent; the other permits citation to opinions
published thereafter, which are not precedent. 5th Cir. R. 47.5(3); 47.5(4). The Fifth
Circuit does not release unpublished opinions for publication in West's Federal
Appendix or for online publication in Westlaw or LEXIS. Hangley, supra note 99, at
654.
165. See, e.g., 4th Cir. R. 36(a). The Rule provides:
Opinions delivered by the Court will be published only if the opinion
satisfies one or more of the standards for publication: i. It establishes, alters,
modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law within this Circuit; or ii. It
involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or iii. It criticizes existing
law; or iv. It contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative;
or v. It resolves a conflict between panels of this Court, or creates a conflict
with a decision in another circuit.
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the reasoning of the unpublished opinion should apply to the case
currently before the court on the strengths of its own merits, apart
from any precedential claim.'66
The third category, including the Third and Eleventh Circuits, as
well as the D.C. Circuit with regard to its opinions issued on or after
January 1, 2002, does not impose restrictions on the circumstances in
which a party may cite an opinion. 167 The Eleventh Circuit considers
unpublished opinions merely persuasive, and the Third Circuit fails to
specify how it will treat unpublished opinions.16  D.C. Circuit Rule
28(c)(1)(B) states that unpublished opinions issued on or after
January 1, 2002, may be cited as precedent, but Rule 36(c)(2) states
that a panel's decision to issue an unpublished disposition means it
believes the opinion lacks precedential value.169 "In other words," one
commentator wrote, in the D.C. Circuit "non-reporter published
opinions may or may not be circuit binding. '"170
The American College of Trial Lawyers contends that the confusion
does not end with the question of citing the circuits' own opinions;
practitioners are further burdened by rules that purport to govern the
conduct of lawyers in remote fora. 17 1 The Second Circuit prohibits
citation of its unpublished opinions in unrelated cases "before this or
any other court."'72 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits' no-citation rules
explicitly prohibit the citation of their unpublished opinions by or to
district courts within their respective circuits.'73 Other circuits are
silent on the territorial reach of their no-citation rules.174 The Seventh
and D.C. Circuits forbid attorneys from citing opinions if citation
would be prohibited in the rendering court. 7 ' The American College
of Trial Lawyers proposed that this unduly burdensome and confusing
166. See Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix:
The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 1, 11 (2002).
167. 3d Cir. R. 28.3.; l1th Cir. R. 36-2; D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(1)(A) (prohibiting
citation to unpublished dispositions prior to January 1, 2002 except for res judicata,
collateral estoppel, and law of the case). The Eleventh Circuit continues to withhold
all its unpublished opinions from LEXIS and Westlaw. See Hangley, supra note 99, at
654.
168. 11th Cir. R. 36-2; 3d Cir. R. 28.3. In December 2001, when the Third Circuit
decided to begin releasing its unpublished opinions to Westlaw and LEXIS, Chief
Judge Becker stated that: "The court will continue to observe Internal Operating
Procedure 5.8, which provides that the court will not cite to non-precedential opinions
as authority." Hangley, supra note 99, at 654 (quoting Press Release, Third Circuit
Court of Appeals (Dec. 5, 2001)).
169. D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(1)(B), 36(c)(2).
170. Hangley, supra note 99, at 657.
171. Id. at 658.
172. 2d. Cir. R. 0.23; see also Hangley, supra note 99, at 658.
173. 7th Cir. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9th Cir. R. 36-3(b); see also Hangley, supra note 99, at
659.
174. See Hangley, supra note 99, at 659.
175. 7th Cir. R. 53(e); D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(2); see also Hangley, supra note 99, at 659.
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system be replaced by a uniform rule allowing citation to unpublished
opinions for their persuasive value. 17 6
Despite the flaws in the no-citation regimes, at least one
commentator suggested that abolishing no-citation rules could
ultimately make matters worse by causing courts to issue more
summary orders and oral opinions.'77
C. Possible Effects of Allowing Citation
1. Oral and Per Curiam Summary Orders
Critics who suggest that judges improperly use unpublished
opinions to dispose of difficult cases and that unpublished opinions
sometimes address novel issues or conflict with existing law,
disapprove of summary orders. 7 s The precedential value (even in the
merely persuasive sense) of a summary order cannot be known
because the court gives "only the result and not the reasoning." '179 A
summary order cannot be scrutinized for its soundness and
consistency with other precedents. 8 ° Thus, expanded use of summary
orders would worsen the problems caused by selective publication and
no-citation rules, with the further disadvantage that the litigants
would receive no explanation for the court's decision.' 8 '
Oral opinions, on the other hand, provide reasoned explanations to
litigants. 8 ' One article argued that oral opinions should replace
unpublished opinions in certain circumstances and that all other
opinions should be published.'83 In cases in which the result is clearly
dictated by well-established precedent-those cases in which
unpublished opinions are supposed to be issued-judges should
deliver reasoned oral opinions extemporaneously from the bench."8
The authors cited an experiment in which the American Academy of
Judicial Education assembled twenty-six appellate judges, who were
presented with bench memoranda and record materials from an actual
appeal.' After hearing oral arguments, the judges completed a
176. See Hangley, supra note 99, at 647.
177. See, e.g., Laretto, supra note 71, at 1053-54 (arguing that reformers should be
wary of causing courts to issue fewer written opinions).
178. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 16, at 763-64, 785-88. Dragich defines a summary
disposition as a judgment of affirmance or reversal absent an explanation of the
court's reasoning. Id. at 763.
179. Id. at 793.
180. See id. at 776.
181. See Laretto, supra note 71, at 1054.
182. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1169, 1172.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1169.
185. Id. at 1172 (citing Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the
Appellate Process, 42 Md. L. Rev. 732, 742-44 (1983)).
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questionnaire about the experience. 186 Twenty-four judges said that
they believed it would have been feasible to announce decisions from
the bench immediately after arguments or within a few minutes
thereafter. 8
7
Oral opinions could be recorded and provided to the parties in
digital format or cassette, and posted on the court's website. 8 8 The
opinions could be transcribed, and, though citable, the authors
contend that their informal nature would make them "less forceful
precedents than their written counterparts.' 1 89
Oral decision making is already common in federal district courts.1 90
If used in the courts of appeals, the authors submit, it will further
spare judges the time and energy they spend writing unpublished
opinions, time that can be used to write opinions for publication.' 9'
Parties will not be restrained from citing any prior decisions, resources
will not be wasted writing opinions of no value, and judges will not be
forced to create binding precedent in every case.192
2. Are Judges More Likely to Use Oral and Per Curiam Summary
Orders in the Absence of No-Citation Rules?
During the Advisory Committee meeting that ultimately resulted in
approval of the New Rule 32.1, one committee member argued, "[i]f
the Ninth Circuit were forced to permit citation of its nonprecedential
opinions, the court would likely issue many fewer such opinions and
many more one-word orders."'9 3 Although Judge Kozinski's fear of
unleashing a flood of citations to unpublished opinions may be
exaggerated, 194 even the perception that this will occur may cause
some judges to dispose of more cases through oral opinions and per
curiam summary orders. 195
A review of the statistics on the use of such dispositions in the
federal courts of appeals shows that these dispositions are relatively
rare, even in circuits that permit citation to unpublished opinions; nor
does there appear to be a significant statistical correlation between
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1169.
189. Id. at 1169-70.
190. Id. at 1171.
191. Id. at 1172.
192. Id.; see id. at 1155-56, 1170.
193. See Minutes of the Fall 2002 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules, 36-37, Nov. 18, 2002, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes/app1102.pdf [hereinafter, Advisory Committee
Minutes].
194. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
195. This term refers to unsigned opinions that do not expound upon the law as
applied to the facts or state the reasons for the result. See 2002 Annual Report, supra
note 14, at tbl. s-3; see also Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 1168.
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more lenient citation regimes and frequency of oral and per curiam
summary orders.'96 Of 27,758 cases terminated on the merits in the
circuit courts dur-ing the year ending September 30, 200002 (excluding
the Federal Circuit), the courts issued only twenty-six oral opinions.'97
It is interesting to note that the Sixth Circuit, which has one of the
more lenient citation rules,' 98 rendered all twenty-six of these
opinions.19 It is difficult to draw any conclusions from this fact,
however, because none of the other circuits that allow citation issued
oral opinions.2 0
The circuit courts issued per curiam summary orders with greater
frequency, in 1,181 of 27,758, or roughly four per cent of cases. 20 1 The
Eighth Circuit, which allows but disfavors citation of unpublished
opinions, issued per curiam summary orders at the highest rate, in
thirty-two per cent of all cases terminated on the merits; the First and
Fourth Circuits, whose rules are similar to the Eighth Circuit's, never
disposed of cases in that manner.2 2 Of the other circuits that permit,
but disfavor, citation to unpublished opinions, the Fifth Circuit issued
per curiam summary orders in one per cent of cases, and the Tenth
Circuit issued only one per curiam summary order.203  The D.C.
Circuit, which allows unrestricted citation to unpublished opinions
issued after January 1, 2002, never issued per curiam summary orders;
the Eleventh Circuit, which permits free citation of unpublished
opinions, issued per curiam summary orders in nine per cent of its
cases. 214  Of the circuits that prohibit citation, the Second Circuit
issued no per curiam summary opinions; the Ninth Circuit disposed of
less than one per cent, and the Seventh Circuit disposed of four per
cent of their cases without signed, explanatory opinions.2 5
D. The Proposed Amendment to FRAP
The weight of commentary arguing against no-citation rules
ultimately led to the Advisory Committee's consideration of a
uniform rule permitting citation to unpublished opinions.20 6  The
Advisory Committee considered three alternative rules before voting
196. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 14, at tbl. s-3.
197. Id.
198. The Sixth Circuit allows unpublished opinions to be cited for their
"precedential" value (if there is no published opinion that would serve as well). See
supra note 162 and accompanying text.
199. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 14, at tbl. s-3.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.; see also supra note 163 and accompanying text.
203. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 14, at tbl. s-3; see also supra note 163 and
accompanying text.
204. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 14, at tbl. s-3; see also supra notes 167,
168.
205. See 2002 Annual Report, supra note 14, at tbl. s-3; see also supra note 160.
206. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 12.
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to approve Alternative B as New Rule 32.1.207 This Note now
describes each alternative.
1. Alternative A
Alternative A specifically authorizes courts of appeals to designate
an opinion as nonprecedential. It provides that:
An opinion designated as non-precedential may be cited for its
persuasive value, as well as to support a claim of claim preclusion,
issue preclusion, law of the case, double jeopardy, sanctionable
conduct, abuse of the writ, notice, or entitlement to attorney's fees,
or a similar claim. A court must not impose upon the citation of
non-precedential opinions any restriction that is not generally
imposed upon the citation of other sources.208
The Advisory Committee ultimately rejected Alternative A because
members believed that to endorse nonprecedential opinions would be
tantamount to taking sides in the debate over the constitutionality of
nonprecedential opinions. 21 The Committee thought it would be
inappropriate to use a procedural rule to embrace one side of the
constitutional controversy.2"0
2. Alternative C
Alternative C mirrors the category of rules that disfavors but
permits citation to unpublished opinions in limited circumstances.
In addition to use in related cases,
[a]n opinion designated as non-precedential may be cited for its
persuasive value regarding a material issue, but only if no
precedential opinion of the forum court adequately addresses that
issue. Citin non-precedential opinions for their persuasive value isdisfavored .2
3. Alternative B
Alternative B does not specifically authorize the designation of
opinions as nonprecedential, but in other respects is identical to
Alternative A.213  The Advisory Committee voted to approve
207. See Advisory Committee Minutes, supra note 193, at 23-39.
208. Advisory Committee Minutes, supra note 193, at 23.
209. See id. at 35.
210. See id.
211. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; see also Advisory Committee
Minutes, supra note 193, at 31.
212. Advisory Committee Minutes, supra note 193, at 32.
213. Id. at 28.
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Alternative B with some textual revisions. 14 As published for
comment, the New Rule 32.1 reads:
(a) Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be
imposed upon the citation of judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or
other written dispositions that have been designated as
"unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential," "not
precedent," or the like, unless that prohibition or restriction is
generally imposed upon the citation of all judicial opinions, orders,
judgments, or other written dispositions.
(b) Copies Required. A party who cites a judicial opinion, order,
judgment, or other written disposition that is not available in a
publicly accessible electronic database must file and serve a copy of
that opinion, order, judgment, or other written disposition with the
brief or other paper in which it is cited.21 5
One commentator criticized the New Rule 32.1 for failing to
unambiguously preserve the circuits' individual choices of what weight
to accord unpublished opinions.216 Professor Stephen R. Barnett of
the University of California, Berkeley, suggested that the language,
"No prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon the citation of
[unpublished] judicial opinions" could be interpreted to mean that
rules limiting the precedential weight of citation of unpublished
opinions impermissibly restrict citation of these opinions.217
Furthermore, Professor Barnett contended that although the
Advisory Committee Notes criticized rules that disfavor citation of
unpublished opinions, it is not clear that such rules would qualify as
"restrictions" under the New Rule 32.1.218
Professor Barnett also argued that the circuits should remain free to
keep in place rules disfavoring citation to unpublished opinions. 219 To
this end, and for the sake of simplicity, Barnett proposed an
alternative rule, which would provide: "Any opinion, order,
judgment, or other disposition by a federal court may be cited to or by
any court. 20
As the arguments for and against allowing citation to unpublished
opinions show, the primary conflict between the opposing sides
concerns litigant autonomy and judicial accountability on the one
hand, versus judicial autonomy on the other hand.
214. Id. at 39.
215. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 12, at 28-29. The Committee
Notes define "generally imposed" as restrictions that apply to all sources, such as
citation format. See id. at 32.
216. See Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report
and Analysis, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process, 473,490-91 (2003).
217. Id. at 490.
218. Id. at 491.
219. Id. at 496-97.
220. Id. at 491.
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III. A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION
New Rule 32.1 attempts to forge a compromise between critics and
supporters of no-citation rules. The Advisory Committee rejected
both the broadest and narrowest alternative formulations in favor of a
rule that strikes a balance between litigant and judicial autonomy.
This part analyzes each of the alternatives considered by the Advisory
Committee in light of the arguments for and against no-citation rules
presented in Part II. Of course, none of the alternatives considered by
the Advisory Committee would satisfy all critics or supporters of the
no-citation rules. For those who contend that to deny binding
precedential effect to federal appellate opinions violates the
Constitution or threatens judicial legitimacy, the New Rule 32.1 does
not go far enough.2 2' On the other side of the spectrum, any uniform
rule that permits citation of unpublished opinions will antagonize
those who equate citation with diminishing judicial efficiency.22 This
part argues that although it fails to address the potential for increasing
use of summary orders (thus undermining judicial accountability),
Alternative B is, nonetheless, the most pragmatic solution in light of
the arguments enumerated in Part II. If the New Rule 32.1 is
ultimately enacted, the Judicial Conference should resolve to study
patterns of summary orders in the circuits, and to take further action if
there is a dramatic increase in the issuance of such orders.
A. Alternative A
Alternative A is most palatable to defenders of unpublished
opinions because it explicitly endorses their use.2 3 It is also consistent
with the original recommendation of the Judicial Conference, namely
that the federal circuit courts should refrain from publishing opinions
that are not of "general precedential value. ' '2 4 Given that no circuit
court accords its unpublished opinions binding precedential authority,
however, this provision adds little-except possibly some reassurance
to judges who worry that eliminating no-citation rules will lead to the
abolition of nonprecedential opinions.225
B. Alternative C
Given the predominance of rules that disfavor but permit citation of
unpublished opinions in certain circumstances, Alternative C may
seem the most natural choice.2 26 The Advisory Committee properly
concluded, however, that there is no persuasive reason to subject
221. See supra Part II.B.3.-4.
222. See supra Part II.A.l.b.
223. See Advisory Committee Minutes, supra note 193, at 23.
224. See Report of the Judicial Conference 1964, supra note 2, at 11.
225. See Advisory Committee Minutes, supra note 193, at 35.
226. See supra Part II.B.6.
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unpublished opinions to citation restrictions that do not apply to other
nonprecedential sources. 227 Parties will, as a practical matter, refrain
from citing unpublished opinions where binding authority supports a
contention.228 Moreover, restricting citation may spawn satellite
litigation over whether a party's citation of a particular opinion was
appropriate.229
C. Alternative B
Alternative B adequately addresses most of the arguments
advanced against no-citation rules.230  The rule would remove all
restrictions on a party's ability to cite unpublished opinions, thus
promoting First Amendment freedoms, 231 as well as easing hardships
practitioners face in keeping track of the many different restrictions
among the circuits. 232 The fact that a court is at liberty to disregard
any of its prior decisions remains troubling under the due process and
judicial analyses recounted in Parts II.B.3. and II.B.4. Nonetheless,
allowing citation to unpublished opinions will minimize the risks of
arbitrary judicial action.233 Citing an unpublished opinion puts the
court on notice that it has previously resolved a case in a particular
way, thus presumably, the court will consider whether to treat the
prior decision as precedential in a similar factual setting.234 As long as
litigants have the ability to use all prior decisions persuasively, a
reviewing court will be less likely to render a decision that is
arbitrarily inconsistent with one of its prior opinions.235
For instance, in Williams v. DART,236 which has been criticized as
arbitrary,237 the Fifth Circuit provided a justification for the apparent
inconsistency between its holding and a prior unpublished opinion.238
The Williams court rejected Anderson v. DART as unpersuasive for
failing to properly examine Eleventh Amendment immunity.239
Furthermore, the district court's decision turned on a different issue
than in Anderson-specifically, DART was not a "person" and the
plaintiff therefore failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.240
227. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 12, at 27; see also Barnett supra
note 216, at 493-97 (analyzing the meaning of "restrictions").
228. See Barnett supra note 216, at 493-497.
229. See id.
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See supra Part II.B.5.
232. See supra Part II.B.6.
233. See supra Parts II.B.3.-4.
234. See supra Parts II.B.3.-4.
235. See supra Parts II.B.3.-4.
236. 242 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2001).
237. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Part II.B.3.
239. Williams, 242 F.3d at 318 n.1 (citing Anderson v. DART, No. 3:97-CV-1834-
BC, 1998 WL 686782 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1998)).
240. Id.
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Thus, the district court's finding that DART was immune was merely
erroneous dicta.241  The Fifth Circuit's affirmance was not an
endorsement of the district court's error, thus Williams is not
arbitrarily inconsistent with Anderson.
Moreover, one consequence of nonpublication-the possibility that
a subsequent circuit panel, unaware of a prior published decision,
might reach a contrary result in a similar case242 -is diminished when
parties are able to bring the earlier disposition to the attention of the
court.24 3 The technology that makes widespread access to unpublished
opinions possible also serves to protect against the development of a
secret body of law.2"
Furthermore, Alternative B fully addresses the First Amendment
argument.2 45 As long as parties are not restricted in their ability to cite
unpublished opinions, neither their freedom of expression nor their
freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances is
infringed. 246  Even if no-citation rules do not violate the First
Amendment, it is nonetheless desirable to allow parties to cite prior
decisions for whatever value they may have. Courts can use their
powers to sanction frivolous arguments if parties abuse freedom of
citation by citing unpublished opinions with no relevance.247
In light of the wide accessibility of unpublished opinions, repeat
litigants will not gain an unfair advantage if unpublished opinions are
citable without restriction.24" Litigants with greater resources will
have an advantage over those with fewer resources due to the
former's ability to pay for additional research. 249  This advantage,
however, is no different in nature than the advantages wealthy
litigants already gain from their ability to hire the best lawyers and
pay for other litigation costs. The argument that inevitable delays will
unfairly disadvantage poor litigants is based on the erroneous
assumption that free citation will compromise judicial efficiency,
which is not likely to occur.25°
Although Judge Kozinski's efficiency argument is not borne out by
any empirical evidence that allowing citation to unpublished opinions
will undermine the operation of the circuit courts,25' there is still
reason for concern that allowing citation of unpublished opinions may
241. Id.
242. See supra Part II.B.4.
243. See supra Part II.B.3. The Fifth Circuit rule allows unpublished opinions to be
cited for their persuasive value. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.4.
245. See supra Part II.B.5.
246. See supra Part II.B.5.
247. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part II.B.5.
249. See supra Part II.A.2.
250. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.1.
251. See supra Part II.B.1.
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cause judges to issue more per curiam summary orders.252 The best
argument for free citation is that there is a category of unpublished
opinions that should be published because they address novel issues
or modify existing law, and only by allowing citation will these cases
come to light, thereby promoting judicial accountability. 3 There is
an inherent tension, however, between this argument and the
strongest argument against citation-that judges may choose not to
explain the reasons for their rulings rather than be confronted with
citations to their unpublished opinions. The Advisory Committee did
not express concern that the pro-citation rule could lead to an increase
in summary orders, and the New Rule 32.1 does not address this
tension.
Nonetheless, given the absence of a meaningful correlation between
the most lenient citation rules currently in force and rates of oral
opinions and per curiam summary orders, it is not likely that these
forms of dispositions will skyrocket in response to a uniform rule
permitting citation.24  The Judicial Conference should resolve to
study the effects of the new rule after it is implemented. 255 Although
an increase in the delivery of oral opinions may actually improve the
administration of justice in the courts of appeals25 6 a sharp increase in
the use of per curiam summary orders would be cause for alarm.257
The Judicial Conference could then consider adopting uniform
guidelines for the issuance of summary orders.
Professor Barnett's criticism of the language of the New Rule 32.1
does not reach the core tension between promoting judicial
accountability through free citation on the one hand, and discouraging
judges from writing opinions at all in certain types of cases on the
other hand. Nonetheless, Professor Barnett made a legitimate point
that the term "restriction" is ambiguous. 8 Is a local rule disfavoring
citation a restriction? 259 Only to the extent that such a rule forbids
citation in certain circumstances (for instance, where counsel fails to
show "persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has not
been addressed in a published opinion"), Professor Barnett argued,
could such a rule be considered a restriction.2 °  If considered a
restriction, the local rule would then be impermissible under the New
Rule 32.1.61 Other local rules that discourage citation are "merely
252. See supra Part II.C.1.
253. See supra Part IL.B.4.
254. See supra Part II.C.2.
255. See supra note 1.
256. See supra Part II.C.1.
257. See supra Part II.C.2.
258. Barnett, supra note 216, at 490-91.
259. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.6.
260. Barnett, supra note 216, at 493.
261. Id.
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hortatory," and therefore do not violate the New Rule 32.1.262
Professor Barnett suggested that requiring circuits to parse and
redraft their rules to bring them into conformance with the New Rule
32.1 could diminish the necessary political support from the circuits
for its enactment.263 On the other hand, there is no reason for the
local circuit rules to disfavor citation to unpublished opinions. As a
practical matter, parties are not likely to cite unpublished opinions
unless there is no published, hence binding, case on point; for this
reason, citation of unpublished opinions will remain "disfavored" by
the parties themselves.2 6 Moreover, no circuit disfavors citation to
other nonbinding legal authorities such as law review articles. Thus, it
would be better to interpret, following the Committee Notes, any rule
that disfavors or discourages citation as a "restriction," and require
the courts to rewrite their rules.265
With regard to according unpublished opinions persuasive value
only, it is important to remember that the court's decision of what
weight to accord an opinion does not restrict the party who cites the
opinion. Parties are free to cite many sources, such as cases, treatises,
law review articles, social science research, and newspaper reports,
which are not binding precedential authority. Thus, unpublished
opinions are treated no differently than these other nonbinding
sources.
CONCLUSION
An effective solution to the no-citation controversy must address
concerns of litigant autonomy, judicial accountability, and judicial
autonomy. The New Rule 32.1 should be adopted as approved
because it preserves a balance between these competing ideas by
pragmatically allowing litigants to cite all opinions, and giving courts
the freedom to choose what weight to accord to unpublished opinions.
The Advisory Committee carefully weighed the arguments on both
sides of the debate and correctly concluded that allowing citation to
unpublished opinions will not decrease judicial efficiency or unfairly
disadvantage litigants. A uniform rule permitting citation will simplify
federal appellate practice and will alleviate concerns that courts are
censoring litigants. Most importantly, it will alter the perception that
unpublished opinions develop secret law and subject litigants to
arbitrary judicial action. To further advance this goal, the Judicial
Conference should study the effect of the New Rule 32.1 after its
enactment. If the use of summary orders increases in the circuits that
currently prohibit citation of unpublished opinions, the Judicial
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
265. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 12, at 32.
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Conference should consider adopting uniform guidelines for the
issuance of summary orders.
Notes & Observations
